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4D WRITTEN
IN 2015, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
DECIDED OMNICARE, INC. v LABORERS
DISTRICT COUNCIL CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY PENSION FUND.' THE
INVESTORS' CLASS ACTION SOUGHT
DAMAGES ARISING FROM THE
REGISTRATION STATEMENT THAT
OMNICARE FILED WITH THE SECURITIES
N ST
The Court held, 9-0, that the issuer's sincere expression
of pure opinion did not constitute an "untrue statement of a
material fact," or an omission of "a material fact . .. necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading."
Writing for the Court,Justice Elena Kagan explained
that these dual bases of liability, recited in Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, are not "an invitation to Monday
morning quarterback an issuer's opinions" if the opinions later
prove incorrect. The Court thus spurned second-guessing from
the relative comfort of hindsight.
With her nod to football, justice Kagan employed a rhetorical
technique that justices and lower federal and state judges have
employed with increased frequency since the early 1970s. In
cases with no claims or defenses concerning sports, written
opinions help decide or explain issues of law or fact with
references to the rules, strategies, or terminology of a wide array
of sports.
Special Cultural Significance
The courts' frequent references acknowledge
that sports holds (as the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 4th Circuit observes) "a special significance
in our culture." Professional sports engage the
attention of broad segments of the American
people, including judges who adjudicate and
lawyers and litigants who comb reporters for
today's opinions and tomorrow's precedents.
The courts' own careful use of sports references
invites advocates to carefully use sports references
to illuminate law or fact in their briefs and other
court filings.
Indeed, careful use of sports references provides
an ideal way for advocates to heed advice from the Douglas
Supreme Court itself "Think of the poor judge UTNiVERSiT
who is reading . .. hundreds and hundreds of co
these briefs," says Chief Justice John G. Roberts,
Jr' "Liven up their life just a little bit ... with something
interesting."6
Years earlier,Justice Wiley B. Rutledge struck the same chord:
"It helps to break the monotony of the printed legal page to add
a bit of life now and then. . . . A dull brief may be good law. An
interesting one will make the judge aware of this."'
Justice Antonin Scalia similarly advised brief writers to
"[m]ake it interesting."' "I don't think the law has to be dull."'
"Legal briefs are necessarily filled with abstract concepts that
are difficult to explain," he continued. "Nothing clarifies their
meaning as well as examples," which "cause the serious legal
points you're making to be more vivid, more lively, antd hence
more memorable."")
Brief writers can "liven up" their court filings, "break the
monotony," and make their submissions "more vivid" with
references to high-visibility sports that Americans follow. With
the Major League Baseball playoffs and the World Series holding




issue about how the courts' use of baseball references can help
advocates energize their own writing.'
As the National Football League playoffs, climaxed by the
Super Bowl, dominate the sports pages in January and early
February, this article discusses the courts' frequent use of football
references in their wntten opinions. The discussion seems
especially instructive for advocates as they hone their written
submissions that seek to explain and persuade. In early 2016,
a Harris Interactive survey provided solid reason why the ewe
lork Times has called the Super Bowl "a de facto national holiday
celebrating the nation's most popular sport."" In the Harris
survey, 33 percent of Americans who follow one or more sport
ranked pro football as their favorite, with baseball coming in
second, at 15 percent.
Football References in the Supreme Court
Even before Omnicare, the justices' frequent use of football
references set an example for advocates. In Alorse v. Frederick
in 2007, for example, the Court rejected a First Amendment
free speech challenge to a high school principal's
suspension of a student who had unfurled
a banner at a school-sponsored and school-
supervised event on a public street near the
Juneau, Alaska campus." The majority found that
the principal had reasonably concluded that the
banner advocated illicit drug use.
Dissenting in Morse, Justice John Paul Stevens
argued that the Court's First Amendment
precedents also required proof that the student's
expression interfered with the school's educational
mission. "[I]nstead of' demanding that the school
make such a showing," wrote Justice Stevens for
Abrarns himself and Justices Souter and Ginsburg, "the
SMISSOU RI Court punts."'
[BIA Other justices have also used "punting" to
describe argumentation or decision making that
assertedly avoids confronting a dlifficult issue, similar to the way
a football team avoids a difficult field position by kicking the
ball downfield arid yielding possession. "'Justices have also called
out efforts to do "end runs" around a rule or obligation, thus
imitating a ball carrier who seeks to evade football tacklers by
cutting a wide path around his own end.'
Like football teams, parties may maintain "playbooks" that
help determine strategy." But justices have also often challenged
arguments, conduct, or Postures that step "out of bounds,""' and
thus thwart momentum in law as in football and various other
sports. In one recent decision, dissenting Chief Justice John G.
Roberts,Jr - the captain of his high school football team years
earlier" - likened a party's late entry into the underlying suit to
"piling on," similar to a late tackle on an opposing ball carrier
who has already been brought down."
In 14rmont 'nkee Nuclear Power (orp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council in 1978, the Court held that the Administrative Procedure
Act's notice-and-comment formula generally established the
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maximum procedure that Congress permitted courts to impose
on agencies in rulemaking proceedings." Writing for the Court,
justice William H. Rehnquist noted that the court of appeals had
imposed greater procedure only after reviewing the record of the
Vermont Yankee rulemaking proceeding itself The Court said
that the review encouraged Monday morning quarterbacking,21
the sort of second-guessing that the Court rejected in Omnicare
more than a generation later.
Football References in the Lower Courts
Lower federal and state court opinions regularly invoke a
wide range of football references. Some of these references
have also appeared in the Supreme Court, but the lower courts'
significantly larger caseloads also permit opportunity for football
references that have not appeared in the United States Reports.
The Nature of Football
In DeBruce v. Commissioner in 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 11th Circuit granted the capital defendant habeas relief
based on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.24 The court
focused on the lead defense counsel's trial performance because
the majority determined that co-counsel had played only a minor
role. The dissenter found the majority's focus unduly narrow
because "a placekicker plays 'only a minor role' in the grand
scheme of a football game, but his efforts nonetheless matter a
great deal.""
In Cabell Humtington Hospital, Inc. v. Shalala in 1996, the 4th
Circuit held that the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
Services had improperly calculated disproportionate-share
payments under the Medicare statute."' The key section
distinguished between patients who were "eligible" for medical
assistance and patients who were "entitled," terms that the
Secretary contended were interchangeable. The court of
appeals rejected the contention. "In a football game," the panel
explained, "wide receivers are eligible to receive the ball from the
quarterback, but none of them is entitled to receive it."2
Other lower court opinions describe counsel's litigation
strategy (like a football coach's offensive and defensive
strategies) as a "game plan,"" which may be found in a
"playbook."" Parties may engage in pretrial or other preliminary
"scrimmages," a term referring to games, often in youth leagues
or interscholastic play that may showcase weaknesses and
strengths but do not count in the league standings in football and
various other sports."' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit says that in a criminal case, "much like a timeout in a
football game momentarily halts the game clock, some pretrial
events temporarily stop the running of the Speedy Trial Act
clock.""
When opposing litigants stake out their respective positions
in anticipation of trial, they (like the offensive and defensive
units of opposing football teams) assume positions at the "line
of scrimmage."" Similar to a running back or pass receiver
when the quarterback turns to him, a party or agency that takes
the initiative "carries the ball,"" even while other participants
remain "on the sideline."" Arguments and conduct must
remain "in bounds,"" and not step "out of bounds" with sharp
practice."' "Punting" describes avoidance of factual or legal
issues."
Courts caution against "end runs" that permit evasion."
Where a party or lawyer engages in the tactic, the offender
should be "thrown for a loss"" because 'as the U.S Court of
Appeals for the 3rd Circuit put it) "end-run tactics might be
suitable on a football field, but they are not persuasive in a court
of law.""'
The US, Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit explains
that appellate courts grant deference to trial court fact finding
because "absent an evidential vacuum or clear error, the final
judgment ... must come from the judicial gridiron, and not
from armchair quarterbacks' reading of the game in Sunday's
paper."" When the trial court rules on whether to admit
assertedly cumulative evidence, the court must decide whether
the evidence would aid the jury, or whether "in the parlance of
the gridiron, [it] will just be piling on.""
A desperate but hopeful quarterback may seek a seemingly
miraculous victory by throwing a long "Hail Mary" pass to a
receiver who is heavily covered near or beyond the goal line in
the waning seconds. A party facing impending defeat at or near
the end of a legal proceeding may throw a "Hail Mary" with a
contention or argument whose success appears unlikely but not
impossible.4
The facts and law developed at trial may indicate either a clear
winner or a close decision. One way or the other, when the court
enters final judgment in a party's favor, "[a] win, whether by four
touchdowns or a last second field goal, is a win."" In a criminal
case, however, "the State's evidence must be persuasive enough
to almost make a touchdown; reaching the midfield is never
enough to meet the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard.".
In a 2016 capital punishment case, the Connecticut Supreme
Court left undisturbed a precedent that was decided by a bench
that included a judge who had retired from the court and been
replaced. In the 2016 case, a concurrence reasoned that because
the precedent had been argued well before the judge's retirement
and replacement, excluding the judge "would have raised the
unsavory specter of running out a football game clock" on him.'"
Judges as Quarterbacks or Refrres
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit says that "trial
judges are somewhat like quarterbacks in that they have a broad
range of options for their game plan, and the losing party is
not entitled to a new trial even when the trial judge's ruling
approaches the maximum latitude of the rules." 7
Courts also frequently liken judges to referees, who are
expected to remain impartial while monitoring the adversaries'
conduct and approaches in football and other sports. In 2015, for
example, the California Court of Appeal reversed a judgment
for the defendant, whose trial counsel committed so many acts
of misconduct that the trial judge's failure to impose sanctions
had the effect of favoring the defendant over the plaintiff. The
panel turned to football: "Imagine a football game in which the
referee continually flagged one team for rule violations, but never
actually imposed any yardage penalties on it.""
In Hunkins v. Bradley in 1979, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
called the trial judge "more than a referee."14 Hunkins held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by questioning
witnesses aid anticipating objections in an effort to accelerate
imobarore
the six-day trial that arose from an automobile collision on a
suburban street. "The referee in a ... football ... game does not
have to concern himself with the length of time the contest takes.
That is the job of the timekeeper," the panel began. "However
in a trial, civil or criminal, it is the judge who has the duty while
affording each side a fair opportunity to present its case, to seek a
reasonably unprotracted conclusion to the proceedings.""
Electronic and Telephone Communications
It has been held that an electronic communication may
be "intercepted" only after the sender's release but before
the communication reaches its destination. A federal district
court explained: "In American football, a ball can only be
intercepted when it is 'in flight.' Once a pass receiver on the
offensive team has caught the ball, the window for interception
has closed, and defenders can only hope to force a fumble.""
In a state proceeding, however, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals explained that football analogies can come up short in
close wiretapping cases: "In football, a quarterback, standing on
his own ten-yard line, may direct a pass to his wide receiver on
the fbrty-yard line. An intervening defensive back, however, with
probable cause to anticipate the pass, may leap up and pull the
ball out of the air at the thirty-yard line. In the binary 'either-or'
world of football, the interception precludes the reception. In
the multi-layered world of electronic surveillance, by contrast,
the message may be received at its destination even as it is
simultaneously intercepted in mid-flight. ""
In another state proceeding, one Nevada Supreme
Court justice concluded that a participant in a telephone
communication cannot also intercept the communication:
"[N]o one would consider it possible for either a football passer
or receiver to be a pass interceptor; obviously, it takes a third
person to capture or seize the football from its intended, two-
person, passer-receiver course.""
An "Ardent Fan" in the Supreme Court
In the Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts
alike, sports references can help judges and advocates reach one
another through the written word. One jurist who likely would
have welcomed brief writers' carefully drawn football references
was Chief Justice Earl Warren, who proudly called himself
an "ardent fan of most sports" because he respected athletic
competition as "an important phase of American life."5"' To
demonstrate key points and to make writing more readable, his
opinons sometimes featured sports references.5,
Chief Justice Warren held a particular passion for football and
baseball. For several years, lie brought the other justices and their
wives to Philadelphia each autumn for the Army-Navy football
game." He rarely missed a Washington Redskins home football
game, attended as many Washington Senators baseball games
as his schedule permitted (often with his clerks), and attended at
least one World Series game whenever the autumn classic was
played in a city near Washington.1
Chief Justice Warren readily explained his unorthodox
practice of reading the daily newspaper from back to front:
"I always turn to the sports section first," he said. "The sports
section records people's accomplishments; the front page,
nothing but man's failures.'
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